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Abstract. Micro-blogging services such as Twitter can develop into valuable 
sources of up-to-date information provided the spam problem is overcome. 
Thus, separating the most relevant users from the spammers is a highly 
pertinent question for which graph centrality methods can provide an answer. In 
this paper we examine the vulnerability of five different algorithms to linking 
malpractice in Twitter and propose a first step towards “desensitizing” them 
against such abusive behavior. 
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1 Introduction 
Twitter is a service which allows users to publish short text messages (tweets) which 
are shown to other users following the author of the message. In case the author is not 
protecting his tweets, they appear in the so-called public timeline and are served as 
search results in response to user submitted queries. Thus, Twitter can be a source of 
valuable real-time information and, in fact, several major search engines are including 
tweets as search results.  
Given that tweets are published by individual users, ranking them to find the most 
relevant information is a crucial matter. In fact, at the moment of this writing, Google 
seems to be already applying the PageRank method to rank Twitter users to that end 
[1]. Nevertheless, the behavior of different graph centrality methods and their 
vulnerabilities when confronted with the Twitter user graph, in general, and Twitter 
spammers in particular, are still little-known. Hence, the study described in this paper 
aims to shed some light on this particular issue besides providing some 
recommendations for future research in the area. 
                                                           
1 A longer version of this study can be found at http://arxiv.org/abs/1004.0816 
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2 Literature Review 
A social network is any interconnected system whose connections are produce of 
social interactions among persons or groups. Such networks can be modeled as graphs 
and, thus, graph theory has become inextricably related to social network analysis 
with a long history of research. However, for the purpose of this paper it should be 
enough to briefly sketch the concepts of centrality and prestige. 
Both of them are commonly employed as proxy measures for the more subtle ones 
of importance, authority or relevance. Central actors within a social network are those 
which are very well connected to other actors and/or relatively close to them. There 
exist several measures of centrality which can be computed for both undirected and 
directed graphs. Prestige, in contrast, requires distinguishing inbound from outbound 
connections. Thus, prestige is only applicable to directed graphs which, in turn, are 
the most commonly used when analyzing social networks. As with centrality, there 
are several prestige measures such as indegree (the number of inbound connections), 
proximity prestige (related to the influence domain of an actor), and rank prestige, 
where the prestige of a node depends on the respective prestiges of the nodes linking 
to them. Nonetheless to say, rank prestige is mutually reinforcing and, hence, it 
requires a series of iterations over the whole network to be computed. 
The later is the most commonly used prestige measure and there exist a number of 
well-known methods to compute one or another “flavor” of such a measure. In the 
following subsections we will briefly review the popular PageRank and HITS 
algorithms, in addition to lesser-known techniques such as NodeRanking, TunkRank, 
and TwitterRank. For the sake of brevity no equations are provided neither for 
PageRank nor HITS. 
2.1 PageRank 
PageRank [2] is one of the best known graph centrality methods. It aims to determine 
a numerical value for each document in the Web indicating the “relevance” of that 
given document. This value spreads from document to document following the 
hyperlinks; this way, heavily linked documents tend to have large PageRank values, 
and those documents receiving few links from highly relevant documents also tend to 
have large PageRank values. A notable property of the algorithm is that the global 
amount of PageRank within the graph does not change along the iterations but it is 
just distributed between the nodes. Thus, if the total amount of PageRank in the Web 
was arbitrarily fixed at 1 we could see the PageRank for a given document as a proxy 
for the probability of reaching that given document by following links at random 
(that’s why PageRank is often described as a random surfer model).  
2.2 Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search – HITS 
HITS [3] is another algorithm to estimate the relevance of a document. The method 
assumes two different kinds of documents in the Web: authorities and hubs. An 
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authority is a heavily linked document while a hub is a document collecting links to 
several authorities. Web pages can exhibit both characteristics and, thus, every 
document has got two different scores: its authority score and its hub score. HITS was 
not aimed to be computed across the whole Web graph but, instead, within a query 
dependent subgraph; however, there is no impediment to apply it to a whole graph. 
2.3 *odeRanking 
NodeRanking [4] is another installment of the random surfer model. The main 
differences between NodeRanking and PageRank are two: (1) it is devised for 
weighted graphs, and (2) the damping parameter is not fixed for the whole graph but 
is computed for each node and depends on the outbound connections of the node. 
The equations underlying this algorithm are shown below. Pjump(p) is the equation 
driving the damping factor for each node: nodes with few outbound links have greater 
probability of being damped which should be interpreted as the random surfer getting 
bored because of the limited set of choices. Pchoose(p) is the probability of a page p to 
be chosen by the random surfer which, when ignoring weights in the edges, reduces to 
the same assumption in PageRank, i.e. a web surfer visiting a given page q would 
continue to any of the p pages linked from q with equal probability. 
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2.4 TunkRank 
TunkRank [5] is one the first prestige ranking methods tailored to the particular 
circumstances of social networks. It lies on three assumptions: (1) each user has got a 
given influence which is a numerical estimator of the number of people who will read 
his tweets. (2) The attention a user pays to his followees is equally distributed. And 
(3), if X reads a tweet by Y he will retweet it with a constant probability p. 
 ! = ∑ 
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2.5 TwitterRank 
TwitterRank [6] extends PageRank by taking into account the topical similarity 
between users in addition to link structure. In fact, TwitterRank is a topic-sensitive 
method to rank users separately for different topics. Additionally, the transition 
probability among users relies in both the topical similarity between users, and the 
number of tweets published not only by the followee, but by all the followees the 
follower is connected to.  
These features make of TwitterRank a highly flexible method. However, we feel 
that it also makes it difficult to scale to the number of users and tweets that are 
published on a daily basis. Because of this, and for the sake of better comparison with 
the rest of graph centrality methods, we slightly modified TwitterRank.  
The differences are the following: (1) instead of computing a different TwitterRank 
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value for each user and topic to be later aggregated, we aimed to compute just one 
TwitterRank value by user. (2) We also changed the topical similarity measure to 
compare users: instead of computing Jensen-Shannon Divergence between users’ 
topic distributions we decided to apply the much more usual cosine similarity. And 
lastly, (3) we simplified the way to compute the damping parameter. The following 
equations provide a description of our implementation of TwitterRank. 
TR(u) is the TwitterRank value for user u; γ is the probability of teleportation –
constant for the whole graph, we used the commonly applied value of 0.15; P(uj,ui) is 
the transition probability from user uj to user ui; |τi| is the number of tweets published 
by user ui, and |τ| is the total number of tweets published by all the users. Lastly, 
sim(uj,ui) is the cosine similarity between the tweets published by users ui and uj. 
/0(+) = (1 − 3) ∑ 4 , +5 · /045 + 3 ·8∈&''*-(9) |:9||:|   
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3 Research Motivation 
3.1 Research Questions 
Social networks are increasingly gaining importance and the contents they provide 
can be exploited to provide up-to-date information (the so-called real-time Web). 
Because of the ease of publishing any content, anytime by anyone, it is ever more 
important to have a way to separate trustworthy sources from the untrustworthy ones. 
Given the success of applying graph centrality algorithms to the Web, it seems 
appealing to do the same with social networks. Thus, the main research questions 
addressed in this study are the following: 1) How vulnerable to link spamming are 
common graph centrality algorithms when applied to user graphs from social 
networks? And 2), is it possible to “desensitize” such algorithms in a way that makes 
no more necessary to detect spammers but, instead, taking into account their presence 
and minimize their influence? 
In addition to the aforementioned methods this author is proposing a variation of 
the PageRank method less sensitive to link abusing in social networks. Such a method 
relies on a de-weighting factor computed from the reciprocal links between users, and 
is described in the following subsection.  
3.2 “Desensitizing” Prestige Ranking Methods against Link Spamming 
The indegree is one of the simplest centrality measures. Translated to Twitter terms it 
is the total number of people following a user: the more followers a user has got the 
more valuable his tweets should be. Users such as Oprah Winfrey, CNN, or TIME are 
almost expected to have millions of followers: they are opinion-makers and mass 
media. One could even find reasons to explain the number of followers for Ashton 
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Kutcher or Britney Spears: they are celebrities. Which is harder to understand is how 
can spammers have far more followers than average users [7]. 
There is, however, a simple explanation for this phenomenon. Twitter has seen the 
emergence of its own etiquette and following back a new follower is considered 
“good manners”. Once spammers took notice of this behavior, it was relatively easy 
to get followers: spammers just needed to massively follow other users.  
Hence, the number of followers is not to be trusted and, indeed, it has been 
suggested that the follower-followee ratio is what really matters. In fact, such ratio 
can be interpreted as the user’s “value” regarding the introduction of new original 
information from the “outside world” into the Twitter global ecosystem. Users 
publishing valuable tweets get followers in spite of being “impolite” (i.e. they do not 
follow back). That way they have huge number of followers but small numbers of 
followees and, thus, their ratios tend to be large. On the other hand, users who tend to 
discuss relatively personal matters with their close group of acquaintances do not get 
large audiences and, in turn, their ratios tend to be small. 
How should we tackle with the spam problem, then? We think the answer lies on 
reciprocal connections. It seems obvious that those users with huge numbers of 
followers simply cannot follow-back everybody (not if they want to actually read 
what their followees are writing). Spammers, however, do not read tweets and, thus, 
they have no constrain in the number of people to follow. In other words, reciprocal 
links should be under suspicion and, hence, we define the follower-followee ratio 
with discounted reciprocity. 
FGHDI_KDC IHK = &''*-L-+-M'&''*L-+-M'  
However, putting under suspicion all reciprocal links seems a bit obnoxious; that’s 
why we suggest employing either the follower-followee ratio or the discounted 
version depending on the possible outcome: if a user would “benefit” of using the 
original ratio then we use the discounted one, and vice versa. Because of that the 
complete name for our proposed ratio is in fact followers to followee ratio with 
paradoxical discounted reciprocity: 
 
It must be noticed that this ratio is not aimed to be directly applied to users in the 
graph but, instead, as a weight within an algorithm such as PageRank: 
0(+) = ∑ NO(8)P(8)P ·
M-MQR+M'_Q+%SQ(8)
MR_M-MQR+M'_Q+%SQ8∈T(9)   
Nevertheless, as we will show below we also employed this ratio to obtain a “pruned” 
version of the user graph. That is, we removed all those users (and their connections) 
with a zero ratio to then apply standard PageRank to the “pruned” graph. 
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4 Research Design 
The main goal of this study was to compare the performance of different graph 
centrality algorithms when applied to social networks. To do that, a dataset, and an 
objective criterion against which to compare the performance of the different methods 
were needed. The dataset was crawled by the author from Twitter. Then, a subset of 
“abusive” users was obtained from that dataset. The basic idea is to compare the 
different algorithms by analyzing the ranking spammers reach with each of them. 
4.1 Dataset Description 
We relied on the Twitter search API to create the dataset for this study. To that end, 
we employed a query composed of frequent English stop words. That query was 
submitted once every minute from January 26, 2009 to August 31, 2009 collecting 
about 28 million tweets. 
Then we obtained followers and followees for each of the 4.98 million users 
appearing in that collection. For the final graph we did not take into consideration 
links from/to users not appearing in the sample and we also dropped isolated users. 
Besides, a substantial amount of user accounts were suspended at the moment of the 
second crawl. Thus, the finally collected Twitter graph consisted of 1.8 million users 
and 134 million connections.  
4.2 Data Preparation: A Subset of Abusive Users within Twitter 
As we have already said, Twitter spammers have both more followees and followers 
than legitimate users. According to [7], they triple the number of both kinds of 
connections; these researchers argue that “spammers invest a lot of time following 
other users (and hoping other users follow them back)”. 
Thus, we decided to focus on Twitter spammers and a method to detect them was 
needed. We implemented a version of the method described in [7] achieving similar 
performance: 87.32% precision versus the 91% reported by them. This spam detection 
system detected 9,369 spammers in the dataset. By examining a representative sample 
we found that about 24% of them were already suspended by Twitter.  
We obtained a list of distinctive terms from spammers biographies and terms such 
as business, money, internet marketing, social media and SEO were 
at the top of the list. Those terms are not only popular among spammers but among 
other Twitter users also. As Yardi et al. [7] said of them: “[They] tread a fine line 
between reasonable and spam-like behavior in their efforts to gather followers and 
attention”. We denoted those users as “aggressive marketers”, and we decided to 
expand the target group from pure spammers to also include them. This way we found 
another 22,290 users which cannot be labeled as spammers but exhibit some common 
behaviors with them (see Table 1). 
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4.3 Evaluation Method 
We did not assume any prior “correct” ranking for the users, instead we consider a 
ranking algorithm should be judged by its ability to avoid abusive users achieving 
undeserved rankings. Hence, the evaluation process was quite straightforward. All of 
the different methods were applied to the Twitter graph to obtain a user ranking. 
Then, we compared the positions reached by spammers and marketers in relation to 
average users. The lower the rankings abusive users reach, the better the method is.  
Table 1. Features characterizing the behavior of spammers, marketers, and average users. 
 Spammers 
Aggressive 
marketers 
Average Users 
Avg. in-degree 3203.28 1338.83 82.36 
Avg. out-degree 3156.09 1245.35 82.36 
Avg. # of tweets over the whole period 
and Std. Dev. 
41.25 (80.99) 12.93 (34.07) 5.60 (19.45) 
% of tweets including URLs 90.42% 32.86% 18.21% 
Avg. # of URLs per tweet including 
URLs 
1.018 1.015 1.014 
% of tweets including hashtags 11.54% 8.83% 7.98% 
Avg. # of hashtags per tweet including 
hashtags 
1.41 1.42 1.50 
% of retweets over total tweets 2.97% 6.50% 2.87% 
% of “conversations” over total 
(excluding retweets) 
6.86% 21.48% 19.26% 
Avg. # of users referred in 
conversational tweets (excluding 
retweets) 
1.17 1.13 1.09 
Table 2. Amount of the global prestige grabbed by abusive users and top rankings reached by 
90% and 50% of the users from each class under different ranking algorithms.  
Ranking 
method 
Spammers Aggressive marketers 
% of global 
prestige 
Ranking of 
90% of 
spammers 
Ranking of 
50% of 
spammers 
% of global 
prestige 
Ranking of 
90% of 
marketers 
Ranking of 
50% of 
marketers 
PageRank 1.4% Top-60% Top-10% 3.3% Top-80% Top-20% 
HITS 5.2% Top-40% Top-10% 11% Top-60% Top-20% 
NodeRanking 1.62% Top-60% Top-10% 3.86% Top-70% Top-20% 
TunkRank 0.74% Top-70% Top-20% 1.94% Top-90% Top-40% 
TwitterRank 0.0003% Top-30% Top-10% 0.00025% Top-80% Top-40% 
Discounted 
PageRank  
0.22% 
N/A: 40% 
spammers 
tie for the 
last position 
Top-20% 1.05% 
N/A: 55% of the aggressive 
marketers tie for the last 
position 
Pruned 
PageRank 
1.84% Top-50% Top-10% 4.27% Top-70% Top-20% 
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5 Results 
About 50% of the spammers detected in the collection of tweets do not appear in the 
graph. Those present account for 0.25% of the users. Regarding the aggressive 
marketers, 98% of them appear in the graph. The acute difference from spammer to 
marketer presence in the graph gives an idea of the work devoted by Twitter to get rid 
of spammers. Hence, the whole set of spammers and marketers represent a mere 1.5% 
of the users. The results obtained by the different ranking methods when confronted 
to these abusive users are summarized in Table 2, and Figures 1 and 2.  
In addition to check the ability of the different algorithms to penalize abusive users 
it would be interesting to also check the level of agreement between the induced 
rankings and their implications. Figure 3 shows the agreement between the different 
methods and PageRank. Such agreements were computed according to the normalized 
version of Kendall distance with a zero penalty parameter [8][9]. 
 
Fig. 1. Percent of spammers found for different slices of the users ranking. 
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Fig. 2. Percent of aggresive marketers found for different slices of the users ranking. 
 
Fig. 3. Agreement between PageRank and the rest of rankings. 
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6 Discussion of Results 
The analysis of the results obtained by PageRank when applied to the Twitter user 
graph supports our initial concern: users in social networks can easily game rank 
prestige algorithms –those described in this study. This is the most plausible 
explanation for spammers being much better positioned than aggressive marketers 
when the value of the contents provide by the former is virtually negligible. 
The similarity between the results obtained by PageRank when applied to the 
complete graph and to the “pruned” version give support to another point of this 
author. Remember that the graph was “pruned” by removing those users with zero de-
weighting which, in turn, was computed taking into account reciprocal links between 
users. One of the arguments of this author is that discounting such links is a fine way 
to separate users contributing value to the network from those with little or no value at 
all. Because the results obtained with both graphs are virtually the same we can take 
that as supportive of the goodness of our initial hypothesis. 
There are two methods which greatly differ not only from PageRank but also from 
the other techniques, namely HITS and TwitterRank. Each of them exhibits different 
problems when applied to the Twitter graph.  
HITS underperforms PageRank with respect to both spammers and marketers, and 
the induced ranking is very different from the other rankings. In fact, because of the 
very nature of HITS, this algorithm is virtually inoperative when confronted with a 
relatively small number of users weaving a tight network of reciprocal connections. 
Hub scores for users who massively follow other users tend to grow very fast and, 
then, those hub scores are used to compute authority scores for their followees (which 
are mostly spammers and are following them back). After just a few iterations those 
users with lots of reciprocal links earn an undeserved amount of authority. Hence, the 
HITS algorithm is not advisable to rank users within social networks without 
previously “cleaning” the graph. 
Regarding the apparently contradictory results obtained by TwitterRank, they are 
due to the highly biased way in which it distributes prestige: the top 10 users account 
for 77% of the total prestige and the top 25 users for 95.5%. Virtually all of the users 
in the network achieve no prestige at all and, in spite of that, spammers manage to be 
“one-eyed kings in the land of the blind”. This is pretty disappointing but, to be fair, 
modifying a topic-sensitive method to operate globally is, perhaps, pushing too hard 
the technique. Anyway, given that even the simplified version used for this research is 
(1) much more computationally expensive than the rest of methods surveyed, and (2) 
it requires much more data (namely, the tweets) to obtain the rankings, it seems not 
recommendable, especially when other available methods (e.g. TunkRank) are faster 
and provide much better results. 
Lastly, there is one method clearly outperforming PageRank with respect to 
penalization of abusive users while still inducing plausible rankings: TunkRank. It is 
certainlty similar to PageRank but makes a much better job when confronted with 
“cheating”: aggressive marketers are almost indistinguishable from common users, 
and spammers just manage to grab a much smaller amount of the global available 
prestige and reach lower positions than those achieved when using PageRank. In 
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addition to that, the ranking induced by TunkRank certainly agrees with that of 
PageRank, specially at the very top of the list, meaning that many users achieving 
good positions with PageRank should also get good positions with TunkRank. All of 
this makes TunkRank a highly recommendable ranking method to apply to social 
networks. 
With regards to the proposal of this author, the results are not conclusive. It seems 
to outperform PageRank –and even TunkRank– because the amount of prestige 
grabbed by abusive users is smaller and their rankings lower than when applying 
standard PageRank. Nevertheless, it has two issues which deserve further research. 
On one hand the induced ranking could be labeled as “elitist” because 70% of the 
users tie for the last position. One could argue that this is unsurprising given that 16% 
of the users from the graph have got a zero de-weighting factor; and, in fact, such 
results are consistent with the well-known participation inequality [10], and with a 
recent study revealing that 75% of the users just publish a tweet every 9 days, and 
25% of the users do not tweet at all [11]. Thus, this could be considered a minor issue. 
On the other hand, “discounted” PageRank exhibits a fairly distinctive curve when 
comparing its agreement with PageRank (see Figure 3). The agreement is much lower 
than, for instance, that found between PageRank and TunkRank, but the most striking 
behavior is the local maximum at the top positions, followed by a relatively large 
trough, to eventually stabilize. We found several lesser-known users at top ranks and, 
after studying them, we concluded that most of them have one or more “famous” 
followers who, in many cases, they manage to outrank. We have denoted this as the 
“giant shoulders” effect and it explains not only the trough at the head of the list but 
the smaller agreement for the rest of the ranking: many of the top users from 
PageRank or TunkRank are a little behind of lesser-known users they are following. 
This is aesthetically displeasing, at least, and the effect it can exert in the applications 
of the ranking is still to be explored. Nevertheless, tackling with this and the former 
issue is left for future research. 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
This study makes four main contributions. First, graph prestige in social networks can 
be “gamed” by means of relationship links. The fact that spammers are always better 
positioned than marketers supports this assert. 
Second, evaluating ranking in itself should not be the point; it should, instead, be 
evaluated within an objective context. Avoiding abusive users to reach undeserved 
rankings is a good metric to compare the performance of different algorithms.  
Third, TunkRank is an obvious candidate to rank users in social networks. 
Although highly related to PageRank, TunkRank outperforms it with respect to 
penalizing abusive users while still inducing plausible rankings. In addition to that, it 
is simple to implement and computationally cheap –at least as cheap as PageRank. 
And fourth, de-weighting the influence of a user by discounting reciprocal links 
seems to be a good way to separate those users contributing valuable contents to the 
global ecosystem from those with little to no value at all. This is supported by the fact 
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that when applying PageRank to both the complete version of the Twitter graph and 
to a “pruned” version we obtained virtually the same results.  
The study opens several lines of research. First, the rankings induced by the 
different methods should be analyzed in other contexts, for instance, as a way to rank 
content providers in order to find relevant information within a social network. 
Second, TunkRank can for sure be manipulated and, thus, its vulnerabilities should be 
thoroughly studied. And third, a deeper analysis of the role of nepotistic links, in 
general, and the discounted ratio described in this paper, in particular, is needed. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank F. Zapico and D. Guerra for their help during the 
Twitter dataset collection, and to M. Fernández for comments on an early draft of this 
paper. This work was partially financed by grant UNOV-09-RENOV-MB-2 from the 
University of Oviedo. 
8 References 
1. Talbot, D. How Google Rank Tweets, http://www.technologyreview.com/web/24353/ 
2. Page, L., Brin, S., Motwani, R., Winograd, T.:  The PageRank Citation Ranking: Bringing 
Order to the Web, http://dbpubs.stanford.edu/pub/1999-66 
3. Kleinberg, J.M.: Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment. In: Proceedings of 
the ninth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pp. 668—677 (1998) 
4. Pujol, J.M., Sangüesa, R., Delgado, J.: Extracting Reputation in Multi Agent Systems by 
Means of Social Network Topology. In: Proceedings of the first international joint 
conference on Autonomous agentsand multiagent systems, pp. 467—474 (2002) 
5. Tunkelang, D.: A Twitter Analog to PageRank, http://thenoisychannel.com/2009/01/13/a-
twitter-analog-to-pagerank/ 
6. Weng, J., Lim, E.P., Jiang, J., He, Q.: TwitterRank: Finding Topic-sensitive Influential 
Twitterers. In: WSDM’10: Proceedings of the third ACM international conference on Web 
Search and Data Mining, pp. 261—270 (2010) 
7. Yardi, S., Romero, D., Schoenebeck, G., boyd, d.: Detecting spam in a Twitter network. 
First Monday, vol. 15, no. 1—4 (2010) 
8. McCown, F., Nelson, M.L.: Agreeing to Disagree: Search Engines and Their Public 
Interfaces. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM/IEEE-CS joint conference on Digital Libraries, 
pp. 309—318 (2007) 
9. Fagin, R., Kumar, R., Sivakumar, D.: Comparing top k lists. In: Proceedings of the 14th 
annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pp. 28—36 (2003) 
10. Nielsen, J.: Participation Inequality: Encouraging More Users to Contribute. 
http://www.useit.com/alertbox/participation_inequality.html 
11. Heil, B., Piskorski, M.: New Twitter Research: Men Follow Men and Nobody Tweets. 
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2009/06/new_twitter_research_men_follo.html 
Actas del I Congreso Español de Recuperación de Información (CERI 2010), Madrid, España, 15 y 16 de junio de 2010
CERI 2010 – 52
